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Abstract
A fundamental dilemma confronts retailers with stand-alone
sites on the World Wide Web and those attempting to build
electronic malls for delivery via the Internet, online services,
or interactive television (Alba et al. 1997). For consumers,the
main potential advantage of electronic shopping over other
channels is a reduction in search costs for products and
product-related information. Retailers, however, fear that
such lowering of consumers’ search costs will intensify com-
petition and lower margins by expanding the scope of com-
petition from local to national and international. Some re-
tailers’ electronic offerings have been constructed to thwart
comparison shopping and to ward off price competition,
dimming the appeal of many initial electronic shopping ser-
vices. Ceteris paribus, if electronic shopping lowers the cost
of acquiring price information, it should increase price sen-
sitivity, just as is the case for price advertising. In a similar
vein, though, electronicshoppingcanlowerthecostofsearch
for quality information. Most analyses ignore the offsetting
potential of the latter effect to lower price sensitivity in the
current period. They also ignore the potential of maximally
transparent shopping systems to produce welfare gains that
give consumers a long-term reason to give repeat business
to electronic merchants (cf. Alba et al. 1997, Bakos 1997).
We test conditions under which lowered search costs
should increase or decrease price sensitivity. We conducted
an experiment in which we varied independently three dif-
ferent search costs via electronic shopping: search cost for
price information, search cost for quality information within
a given store, and search cost for comparing across two com-
peting electronic wine stores. Consumers spent their own
money purchasing wines from two competing electronic
merchants selling some overlapping and someuniquewines.
We show four primary empirical results. First, for differ-
entiated products like wines, lowering the cost of search for
quality information reduced price sensitivity. Second, price
sensitivity for wines common to both stores increased when
cross-store comparison was made easy, as many analysts
have assumed. However, easy cross-store comparison had
no effect on price sensitivity for unique wines. Third,making
information environments more transparent by lowering all
three search costs produced welfare gains for consumers.
They liked the shopping experience more, selected wines
they liked more in subsequent tasting, and their retention
probability was higher when they were contacted two
months later and invited to continue using the electronic
shopping service from home. Fourth, we examined the im-
plications of these results for manufacturers and examined
how market shares of wines sold by two stores or one were
affected by search costs. When store comparison was difﬁ-
cult, results showed that the market share of common wines
was proportional to share of distribution; but when store
comparison was made easy, the market share returns to dis-
tribution decreased signiﬁcantly. All these results suggest
incentives for retailers carrying differentiated goods to
make information environments maximally transparent, but
to avoid price competition by carrying more unique
merchandise.
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Introduction
Emerging electronic channels create a fundamental di-
lemma for retailers with stand-alone sitesontheWorld
Wide Web and for those attempting to build electronic
malls for delivery via the Internet, online services, or
interactive television. Alba et al. (1997) present thecase
that for consumers, the main attraction of interactive
electronic retailing is a reduction in search costs for
products and product-related information. However,
it is precisely this lowering of search costs that retailers
fear most. Their concern is that electronic retailing will
intensify competitionandlowermarginsbyexpanding
the scope of competition from local to national and
international (Anders 1998, 1999; Economist 1999; Gove
1999; Kuttner 1998; Quelch and Klein 1996; Reeve1998;
Trudeau 1999).
Established retailers seem to view these emerging
channels as inevitable but potentially lethal. They
therefore conﬁgure their individual electronicstoresso
that it is difﬁcult to compare their merchandise with
that of other stores selling on the same channel. In ad-
dition, when third-party agents like Anderson Con-
sulting’s Bargain-Finder are created to facilitate cross-
store electronic search, merchants attempt to block
them from their sites (Bakos 1997, Pazgal and Vulcan
1998, Quick 1998b). When infomediaries invite multi-
ple retailers to participate in electronic markets, the
large and established retailers resist, preferring tohave
their own individual sites (Bounds 1999). Thus, we see
three interrelated themes of fear of price competition,
fear of comparison shopping, and perceived disincen-
tives for electronic retailers to cooperate in lowering
cost of search for information consumers might desire.
Our paper presents an empirical analysis and exten-
sion of the ideas suggested by Alba et al. (1997) and
Bakos (1997). Alba et al. argued that conventional re-
tailers ﬁxated on the potential for electronic shopping
to lower search costs for price information and to
heighten competition. This drove them to create defen-
sive, toe-in-the-water interactive offerings with few
beneﬁts to consumers, opening the door to new, elec-
tronic competitors such as Amazon, e-Toys, etc.
1 Ar-
guably, this response misanalyzed the effects of low-
ered search costs in the short run (i.e., the consumer’s
1For anecdotal support, e.g., Krantz (1998, p. 40), Downes and Mui
(1988, p. 88), Steinhauer (1998), Wigand and Benjamin (1995).
ﬁrst transaction with an electronic interface) and in the
long run, ignoring how lowered search costs might af-
fect the customer’s lifetime value.
Consider ﬁrst how the consumer might be affected
by search costs on the ﬁrst transaction with an elec-
tronic merchant. Both Alba et al. (1997) and Bakos
(1997) made the point that electronic shopping does
not just lower the cost of search for price information.
Independently, it can lower the cost of search for qual-
ity information, decreasing price sensitivity. Alba et al.
argued that consumersalsovaluethepotentialforelec-
tronic shopping to lower search costs by a third route.
By supporting comparisons across merchandise sold
by competing vendors, electronic shopping increases
consumers’ ability to choose merchandise that will
maximize consumption utility (Ha ¨ubl and Trifts, this
issue). We therefore add to our investigation the im-
pact of interstore comparison on the beneﬁts of inter-
active shopping systems and consumer price sensitiv-
ity. As other analysts have suggested, we expect that
making interstore comparisons easier should increase
price sensitivity for items carried by multiple compa-
rable stores. We expect to ﬁnd, however, that this re-
sult will not hold for differentiated merchandise sold
exclusively by one retailer. Moreover, if the stores dif-
fer in the information they offer, in their appearance,
or in the beneﬁts they provide, the additional infor-
mation consumers will derive from interstore compar-
ison may result in decreased price sensitivity.
Alba et al. (1997; see also Quick 1998a,b) noted that
third-party efforts to provide cross-shopping services
can be hamstrung if retailersrefusetocooperateinpro-
viding relevant information. Theymaintained,though,
that in the long run, efforts by electronic merchants to
make cross-shopping difﬁcult are doomed to failure,
removing much of what makes the electronic venue
more appealing than other retail formats. Moreover, if
consumers value the beneﬁt of cross-shopping online,
some other entrants will offer it (e.g., www.autoby
tel.com, www.bizrate.com, www.compare.net, www
.killerapp.com, www.mysimon.com, www.personal
logic.com, www.weddingchannel.com, www.wire
lessdimension.com, and www.zdnet.com), and con-
sumers will demand it (Erlich and Fisher 1982). Con-
sumers may choose to patronize those sellers who de-
liver this beneﬁt, bypassing those who do not.LYNCH AND ARIELY
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Our paper attempts to provide empirical evidence
about the short-run and long-run consequences of the
different lowered search costs, to better understand
consumer, retailer, and manufacturer incentives in
electronic markets for differentiated products. We
have three purposes:
• to examine the conditions under which lowered
electronic search costs should increase or decreasecon-
sumer price sensitivity (Alba et al. 1997, Bakos 1997)
and to make plainer that retailers selling differentiated
product categories face a very different scenario for
common merchandise than for unique merchandise
sold exclusively by them;
• to demonstrate (somewhat obvious) consumer
welfare gains from providing increasingly transparent
informational environments, highlightingwhy“defen-
sive” interactive home shopping offerings may be un-
sustainable; and
• to examine the effects of search costs on market
share returns to distribution, thus shedding some light
on how lowered electronic search costs affect manu-
facturer disincentives to grant exclusive distribution—
e.g., to sell private label merchandise or branded var-
iants (Alba et al. 1997).
We elaborate each of these in turn in thesectionsthat
follow.
Search Costs and Price Sensitivity
The popular business press has ﬁxated on the potential
for electronicshoppingtoincreasepricesensitivity,but
academic scholars have noted circumstances under
which electronic shopping might either increase or de-
crease price sensitivity and/or prices (Alba et al. 1997,
Bakos 1997, Degaratu et al. 1998). It is true that elec-
tronic shopping may reduce the cost of search in ways
that enlarge consumers’ consideration sets and that
make price comparisons easier. Ceteris paribus, if elec-
tronic shopping lowers the cost of acquiring and pro-
cessing price information, it should increase price sen-
sitivity, just as is the case for price advertising
(Popkowski-Leszczyc and Rao 1990, cf. Boulding et al.
1994).
At the same time, a well-constructedelectronicshop-
ping site can provide a vehicle for conveying nonprice
information related to quality that is superior to the
comparable information that can be gleaned from
shopping in conventional malls, catalogs, etc.
(Hoffman et al. 1995). The consequences of better dif-
ferentiating information should be like the effects of
differentiating advertising (Kaul and Wittink 1995;
Mitra and Lynch 1995, 1996). Advertising can convey
differentiating information that reduces consumer
price sensitivity. So too can these interactive channels.
If there are real differences among retailers in mer-
chandising, assortment of complementary products,
and service, interactive channels could be more effec-
tive thanexisting modesofretailinginconveyingthose
points of differentiation.
Following Alba et al. (1997) and Bakos (1997), we
expect that lowering search costs for price information
will increase consumer price sensitivity. But insofar as
search costs for differentiating, quality information are
lowered, consumer price sensitivity will decrease, and
the latter effect may outweigh the former. Thus, if a
site decreases search costs only for price—either sort-
ing within a single retailer’s store or sorting across
stores—price sensitivity will increase. However, if a
site decreases search costs for both price and quality
information, price sensitivity need not increase com-
pared to a case in which both costs are high. The net
effect is a matter of the calibration of the size of these
two search cost reductions, as well as certain moder-
ator variables. In the present research, we test hypoth-
eses about conditions under which the effects of search
cost for quality do or do not outweigh those of search
costs for price. Our aim is not to assert the generality
of our empirical results but to provide a theoretical
perspective for anticipating the economic conse-
quences of shifting the different search costs in differ-
ent kinds of product markets.
Bakos (1997) pointed to two factors that can affect
the degree to which the effects of more transparent
quality information will outweigh those of easier price
search. The ﬁrst is the degree of differentiation in the
product category and the associated degree to which
consumers suffer from “lack of ﬁt” cost for choosing
an alternative that is not closest to their ideal. Second,
Bakos noted that the relative size of effects of search
costs for price and quality information should depend
on the number of sellers. With more sellers, the effects
of lowered cost of price information become more
pronounced.LYNCH AND ARIELY
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We wish to demonstrate the rhetorical point that ef-
fects of easier quality search may outweigh those of
easier price search, so we chose to study a category in
which these factors magnify the relative weight of
search costs for quality information: selling of ﬁne
wines. In the experiment that we report, two compet-
ing electronic wine stores each carry some wines ex-
clusively and some wines that are common to both
stores. We hypothesize that making cross-store com-
parison easy will increase price sensitivity when an-
other vendor carries the same product but will have
little effect when retailers are carrying differentiated
merchandise sold by a single seller. This point has not
been considered explicitly in prior academic or popu-
lar discussions of the effects of electronic search costs
on price sensitivity, but we can deduce it from both
behavioral and economic principles. When the same
wine is sold at one store for a higher price than at an-
other equivalent store, buying at the more expensive
store is dominated. Ha ¨ubl and Trifts (1998) have
shown that electronic comparison aids reduce propen-
sity to choose dominated options. A similar effort to
make cross-store comparisons easy should have less
effect on sales of unique wines, wherea changeinprice
does not create dominating and dominated options.
One can also deduce the hypothesis that comparison
should have more effect on common than on exclu-
sively carried wines by reinterpreting Bakos (1997), al-
though his model does not consider highly differenti-
ated product markets in which some alternatives are
perfect substitutes. We assert that the user of a price-
search engine for a pre-speciﬁed SKU is searching for
an “undifferentiated” good even if the category as a
whole is differentiated. Thus, price sensitivity should
be higher for cross-store comparison of common than
of unique wines. Under this interpretation, our con-
trast of the effects of lowered search costs on common
versus unique wines allows us to understand the ef-
fects of lowered search costs in markets with low ver-
sus high differentiation.
Search Costs and Consumer Welfare
Lowering search costs for price and quality informa-
tion and for comparing merchandise from competing
stores does not just affect price sensitivity. More trans-
parent, “full featured” electronic shopping systems
may improve consumer welfare in several obvious
ways. First, consumers are likely to value reduced
shopping effort on all three of these search costs, so
they enjoy the shopping experience more. For exam-
ple, Ariely (1999) demonstratesthatelectronicenviron-
ments that allow greater ﬂexibility in search increase
consumers’ satisfaction with the site. Second, lowered
search costs for quality information and easier store
comparison should improve decision quality, helping
consumers to better match heterogeneous brands to
their personal tastes—just as advertising improves the
match between consumers with heterogeneous tastes
and heterogeneous products (Bakos 1997, Mitra and
Lynch 1996, Rosen 1978).
If consumers prefer more transparent informational
environments, sellers offering lower search costs
should beneﬁt from better retention. We noted earlier
that sellers have attempted to thwart such compari-
sons, and Bakos (1997) has noted seller incentives to
do so. However, we argue that such defensive strate-
gies of some Internet retailers contribute to their tepid
sales. Consumers may be more likely to reward full-
featured, “transparent” electronic merchants with re-
peat business (cf. Hoffman et al. 1995).
Manufacturer Market Share Returns to Distribution
The experiment to be reported studies only buyer be-
havior, treating seller behavior as exogenous. How-
ever, one might anticipate how retailers and manufac-
turers might adapt to consumer responses to reduced
search costs. We predict that retailers will ﬁnd that
consumers give more business to sellers who provide
transparent shopping experiences that lower search
costs for price, quality, and store comparison. We have
also predicted that retailers will ﬁnd that providing
this transparency will intensify price sensitivity for
common but notforuniquemerchandise.Whatmarket
pressures will these twin dynamics produce?
Alba et al. (1997) discuss the potential for electronic
retailing to threaten (inter)national brands, by shifting
the formula for retail success from stocking branded
goods that draw customers into the stores to stocking
exclusive merchandise. If a customer can buy the same
pair of Levis over the Internet from multiple vendors,
price competition may erode dealer margins. RetailersLYNCH AND ARIELY
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may respond by replacing the branded item with a
slightly less popular exclusive or private label offering
(Faust 1997, King and Bounds 1997, White 1998) or by
demanding “branded variants” exclusive to a givenre-
tailer (Bergen et al. 1996).
Manufacturers could respond by striking deals with
retailers for exclusive distribution, but this would en-
tail a potential penalty of lost sales through stores no
longer used as distributors (Reibstein and Farris 1995).
The interesting conceptual question iswhethermaking
electronic comparison easy will reduce returns to dis-
tribution—in essence, lowering the sales penalty for
granting exclusivity.
One might predict that easy comparison should in-
crease the share of common brands, because these
should be more likely to be found at a low price when
cross-shopping is easy. Similarly, common brands
might beneﬁt if easy comparison revealed asymmetric
dominance (Ariely and Wallsten 1995, Huber et al.
1982). Our prediction, though, is that easy comparison
should reduce the share of common brands relative to
unique ones. Just as brands draw market share more
heavily from more similar alternatives (Meyer and
Kahn 1991, Tversky 1972), we anticipate that easycom-
parison will make more apparent that a bottle of wine
sold at two different retailers is, in fact, the same, de-
spite differences in price or format of description. Easy
comparison should reveal real differences when they
do exist, but should also make plainer real similarity
and dominance (Ha ¨ubl and Trifts, this issue).
We report below an experiment in which consumers
shop with their own money at two competing elec-
tronic wine merchants carrying partially overlapping
inventories. We vary independently three components
of search costs in electronic shopping: the ease with
which consumers can access price information, quality
information, and can make cross-store comparisons.
We consider the current “status quo” for most brick
and mortar retailers’ Internet retailing sites to corre-
spond to our condition in which it is difﬁcult to access
price and quality information or to make store com-
parisons.
2 Our condition where search costs for price
2This characterization is becoming less true as even laggard brick
and mortar retailers are confronted with the startling successofnew,
purely electronic competitors. The most prominent of these do not
facilitate store comparison, but make price and quality information
easy to access and process.
and quality are low and where store comparisons are
made easy approximates the kind of transparent elec-
tronic shopping system that consumers might see as
having beneﬁts over competing retail formats.
Experiment
Method
Overview. Seventy-two M.B.A. and Ph.D. stu-
dents and staff were recruited to participate in a test
of an electronic shopping system described as being
similar to Virtual Vineyards (now www.wine.com).
Respondents were told that wines would be sold at
signiﬁcant discounts relative to prices for the same
wines from area merchants, and that the researchers
would contribute $5.00 to the M.B.A. Games charity
fund-raiser for each participant who bought one or
more bottles. Participants ﬁrst shopped for wine from
our two competing electronic wine merchants, Jubilee
and Dionysus. A total of 100 wines were available.
Each store sold 60 wines, 20 of which overlapped and
40 of which were unique to the store. Consumers went
on a series of eight shopping trips, across which the
prices of the different wines varied independently. In
this way, we could assess price sensitivity at the indi-
vidual subject level by measuring how the quantity of
wine purchased depended on its price level.
We independently varied Price-Usability (High or
Low)   Quality-Usability (High or Low)   Store-
Comparability (High or Low) in a 2 2 2 between-
subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of the eight conditions. The primary dependent
variables at this stage were price sensitivity for wines
(computed by pooling across all wines, and also com-
puted separately for common versus unique wines),
market share of the common wines, and liking of the
shopping experiences. We also took measures of
breadth and depth of search.
After performing the shopping part of the study,
participants were asked to taste 10 of the wines to see
which they actually preferred. We computed from
each participant’s ratings a measure of liking for wines
chosen earlier and for wines unchosen in the shopping
phase.
Two months later, an e-mail announcementwassentLYNCH AND ARIELY
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to participants in which they were asked if they would
like to continue using the same electronic wine-
shopping system from their homes for future pur-
chases of wines. This measure of service subscription
was taken as an indicator of retention of the service.
Procedure for Electronic Wine-Shopping Task.
Respondents reported to the M.B.A. computing lab at
prearranged times. They were told that they would go
on eight shopping trips, with the prices of the wines
varying from trip to trip. On each trip, respondents
searched through the wines in either one or both stores
and purchased as much or as little wine as they
deemed appropriate. Respondents were asked to buy
as much wine as they normally might consume in a
month. Once they had ﬁnished purchasing wine for
that “month’s” shopping trip, they indicated so and
started a new month’s shopping trip. This continued
until all eight trips were completed.
Respondents expected to use their own money to
pay for the wines they selected, and they did in fact
pay for their purchases. We were concerned, however,
that our price sensitivity measures (Quantity Differ-
ence and Price Elasticity) would be less stable if re-
spondents with real budgetconstraintspurchasedonly
a few wines. Therefore, respondents were told that
they would take eight shopping trips but that they
would actually purchase only the wines they chose on
one of the trips, to be randomly determined at the end
of the experiment. Because respondents could not
know which trip would be chosen, they were told to
treat each one as if that would the one selected for the
real transaction. As a consequence, we were able to get
eight times as many purchases as we would have if
respondents were paying for what they selected on
each of the eight shopping trips. We also avoided in-
ventory effects. All of the wines sold were on discount
on four of the eight trips and were sold at regular price
on the remaining four trips, although the discounted
wines were not specially noted in any way. Respon-
dents were instructed that they were not obliged to
purchase any wines at all—after all, they were spend-
ing their own money.However,allparticipantsbought
at least three bottles. The shopping task took between
30 and 75 minutes.
At the end of the electronic shopping task, partici-
pants were asked to rate how enjoyable the shopping
experience had been for them. This responsewasgiven
on a scale from 0 (not enjoyable at all) to 100 (very
enjoyable). In addition, participants answered a bat-
tery of questions that were aimed at assessing their
knowledge of wine. Therewere twotypesofquestions:
one that related to experience with wine (amount typ-
ically consumed, frequency of purchase, prices typi-
cally paid, etc.) and one that asked respondents to
identify different varieties of wine as being red or
white. From participants’ answers, we were able to
construct a measure of wine expertise that was unidi-
mensional and that exhibited marginally acceptablere-
liability (Cronbach’s    0.65). We had anticipated
that expertise might moderate the effects of Quality-
Usability. However, expertise had no effects and will
not be discussed further.
Independent Variables. As mentioned earlier, the
independent variables were Price-Usability (High or
Low), Quality-Usability (High or Low), and Store-
Comparability (High or Low). For analyses of price
sensitivity, there was a fourth, repeated factor of Wine
Block Uniqueness (Unique versus Common). This fac-
tor was not relevant to other dependent variables.
When Price Usability was high, price information
was displayed in the ﬁrst-level list of available wines,
with a tool available to permit sorting by price. When
Price Usability was low, the initial list of wine names
did not show their prices nor was a tool available to
sort wines by prices; respondents had to click on a
wine name to bring up a screen with its price.
Quality Usability was varied by a parallel manipu-
lation. When Quality Usability was high, the ﬁrst-level
list of wine names displayed descriptions of the wines
using differentiating sensory attributes. Wines at Dio-
nysus were described in terms of complexity, acidity,
body, and sweetness/dryness, using bar graphs pat-
terned after those used by Virtual Vineyards
(www.wine.com). Wines at Jubilee were described in
terms of body, sweetness/dryness, intensity, and tan-
nin, with numerical valuesof1 to 7 foreachdimension.
This difference in format was intended to mirror the
real world, in which competing vendors are unlikely
to make the same information available or to use com-
mon display forms. In addition, when Quality Usabil-
ity was high, respondents could sort the wine by va-
rietal (e.g., Chardonnay, Merlot, etc.). Finally,LYNCH AND ARIELY
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Figure 1 A Schematic RepresentationoftheDifferentElectronicShop-
ping Interfaces
Note: (Actual screens used were signiﬁcantly more detailed and are available
from the authors.) The left panel shows the condition where Price Usability,
and Quality Usability are high, and Store Comparability is high. The right
panel shows the condition where Price Usability, and Quality Usability are
low, and Store Comparability is low. Within these two panels, the top panel
shows the information that was available at the highest level of the interface
(without any search cost), and the bottom panel shows the information that
was available at the second level of the interface (with search cost). In the
“full-featured electronic shopping” (left panel), all the information was pre-
sented at the highest level, and additional descriptive information was pre-
sented at the second level. In the “impoverished status quo electronic shop-
ping” (right panel), none of the information was presented at the highest
level, and participants had to drill down to get information about price, qual-
ity, or the other store.
respondents in this condition could click or “drill
down” to see further differentiating comments (e.g.,
“Fun red wine? Here it is! A very pleasing bardolino
with cherry and grape ﬂavors and an easygoing de-
meanor. It’s soft, juicy, and even sports hints of com-
plex ﬂavors such as vanilla and jam. But don’t be
fooled; it’s down-to-earth and fun.”) The differentiat-
ing comments were provided by the head wine buyer
at the top wine store in the area. He augmented his
own sensory comments with comments from Wine
Spectator magazine. (He also provided the sensoryrat-
ings.) When Quality Usability was low, the standard-
ized descriptions on sensory dimensions did not ap-
pear on the ﬁrst screen containing the list of wines.
Instead, participants had to click on a wine’s name on
the ﬁrst screen to see them and no tool was available
to sort wines by varietal. Furthermore, there was no
ability to drill down to see a further differentiating
comment.
Store Comparability was varied by the nature of the
display subjects saw on ﬁrst-level viewing screens.
When Store Comparability was high, the screen was
divided in half, with Dionysus on the left and Jubilee
on the right. The navigation tools mentioned earlier
were provided at the bottom of each store’s display,
and the respondent could independently view and
navigate both stores. The wine list in each half was
displayed initially in alphabetical order, but any sort-
ing tool available in one store would simultaneously
sort the wines from both stores on the same criterion.
When Store Comparability was low, only one store ap-
peared on the screen at a time. If the respondent was
shopping at Dionysus, theright-handsideofthescreen
for Jubilee was blank. If respondents were shopping at
one store and then wanted to visittheother,theirshop-
ping carts emptied; they hadto start againfromscratch
at the ﬁrst store if they returned after visiting the sec-
ond. Moreover, sorting tools used at one store had no
effect on the ordering of wines displayed at the other
store. Such interfaces again mimic currentreality.Most
merchants do not let consumers hold on to their un-
consummated purchases while they leave the store.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the ﬁrst and second
screens in two conditions: when Price Usability and
Quality Usability were high and Store Comparability
was high (on the left), and when Price Usability and
Quality Usability were low and Store Comparability
was low (on the right). Moving among the different
screen levels was done by clicking with a mouse on the
tools that appeared at the bottom of the screen. Figure
2 shows the actual ﬁrst and second screens seen by
subjects in the low Price Usability, low Quality Usa-
bility, and high Store Comparability condition; and
Figure 3 shows the ﬁrst and second screens seen by
subjects in the high Price Usability, high Quality Usa-
bility, and high Store Comparability condition.
Dependent Measures: Price Sensitivity. The ma-
jor dependent measures were based on the difference
in wine purchasing when the wines were on discount
and when they were not. Because we had only eight
shopping trips, it was not possible to vary the price of
each of the 100 wines independently. We therefore di-
vided the wines up into ﬁve “wine blocks,” each ofLYNCH AND ARIELY
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Figure 2 Screens (1) and (2) for Low Price Usability, Low Quality
Usability, High Store Comparability
which was a stratiﬁed random sample of the universe
of 100 wines. Each store had three wine blocks of 20
wines each. Two wine blocks in each store included
only wines that were unique to that store and one
block included only wines sold in both stores. If we
designate the ﬁve wine blocks by letters, Dionysuscar-
ried wine blocks A, B, and E, and Jubilee carried wine
blocks C, D, and E .
We varied the prices of these wine blocks indepen-
dently across the eight shopping trips taken by each
respondent. Note that the prices of the common block
of wines (E) in Dionysus were varied independentlyof
the prices for the same block of wines in Jubilee (E ).
We used eight price combinations, orthogonally
changing the prices of the six wine blocks A, B, C, D,
E, and E . Each wine block was sold at its regular price
on four of the eight trials and at a 15% discount on the
other four trials. The order of exposure to the eight
price combinations was counterbalanced.
For each participant, we separately calculated price
sensitivity collapsed across all six wine blocks pooled
across stores. To test hypotheses about how the effects
of ease of Store Comparison might interact with the
overlapping versus nonoverlapping nature of the mer-
chandise, we separately calculated both measures for
(4) unique and for (2) common merchandise blocks.
For each respondent, we calculated two measures of
how sensitive a wine block’s sales were to changes in
its own price: Quantity Difference and Price Elasticity.
Quantity Difference is a measure of the slope of an
individual’s demand curve. It equals the total number
of bottles purchased from a wine block in four high-
priced trials minus the total purchased in four low-
priced trials. For each respondent, we calculated one
such measure collapsing across all six blocks, as well
as separate measures collapsing across the four unique
blocks and across the two common blocks. The overall
measure of Quantity Difference is not the unweighted
average of the measures for unique and for common
blocks, because each store had two unique wine blocks
and one common wine block. (The same is true for
price elasticity measures.) Each Quantity Difference is
divided by the number of wine blocks included in the
measure, indicating the per-block difference in total
quantity of the block purchased at high versus low
prices.
Similarly, we calculated Price Elasticity collapsing
across all six wine blocks and separately for the (col-
lapsed) four unique wine blocks and for the two com-
mon blocks. The Price Elasticity measure was based on
the proportional change in this quantity relative to the
proportional price change. Again, negative values cor-
respond to downward-sloping demand.
To calculate Price Elasticity, let Q(R) refer to the
quantity of wines sold at regular price, and Q(D) refer
to the quantity sold at the discounted price. Let $(R)
refer to the regular price of the wines, and $(D) refer
to their discounted price. By relating the proportional
difference in quantity purchased under thetwopricing
conditions to the proportional change in price, we get
the formula for Price Elasticity shown in Equation (1):LYNCH AND ARIELY
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Figure 3 High Price Usability, High Quality Usability, High Store
Comparability
{Q(D)   Q(R)} {$(D)   $(R)}
. (1)  {Q(D)   Q(R)}/2 {$(D)   $(R)}/2
Note that in our case, because the discount was al-
ways ﬁxed at 15%, the price part of the equation (the
denominator) is a constant (0.85   1.0)/(0.85   1.0)/
2    0.162162.
Price Elasticity and Quantity Difference each have
advantages and disadvantages. Price elasticity is the
normatively relevant measure, but individual-level
price elasticity is not preserved by aggregation. That
is, price elasticity aggregating quantities across all re-
spondents and then calculating Equation (1) is not
identical to calculating Equation (1) separately for each
individual and then averaging the individual values.
Respondents buying few bottles of wine are weighted
equally to those buying many in calculating the aver-
age individual-level price elasticity, but those buying
many bottles contribute more to the aggregate price
elasticity. Quantity difference is preserved by aggre-
gation; the value of Quantity Difference averaging
quantities purchased across individuals is equal to the
average of the individual quantity differences.
Dependent Measure: Market Share of the Com-
mon Wines. For eachindividual,wecalculatedCom-
mon Wine Market Share   (Total Purchases of Com-
mon Wine Blocks) / (Total Purchases Common Wine
Blocks   Total Purchases Unique Wine Blocks).
Dependent Measures: Search During Shop-
ping. We also collected various measures of the
shopping process for each respondent relating to
depth and breadth of search (cf. Novak and Hoffman
1997). We will explore their relationships to price
sensitivity.
1. Scroll is the sum of times subjects hit the “Next”
and “Previous” Scroll buttons. This is a measure of
amount of shallow, broad search.
2. Sort By Price is the number of times the respon-
dent sorted the wines by price. This was possible only
in High Price-Usability conditions.
3. Sort By Varietal is the number of times the re-
spondent sorted the wines by varietal (Chardonnay,
Merlot, etc.). This was possible only in high Quality
Usability conditions.
4. Drill for Wine Comment is the number of times
the respondent drilled down to view the differentiat-
ing comment (e.g., “Fun red wine? Here it is . . .”). This
was possible only in high Quality Usability conditions.
5. Drill for Missing is a measure of the number of
times respondents drilled down to a second screen to
access “missing” information about either price(inlow
Price Usability high Quality-Usability conditions) sen-
sory quality ratings (in high Price-Usability–low
Quality-Usability conditions), or both (in low Price
Usability–low Quality Usability conditions). In high
Price Usability–high Quality Usability conditions, this
drilling was not possible or necessary.
Dependent Measure: Rated Liking of Purchased
Wines. After completing the computer-shopping
task, respondents proceeded to the wine-tasting task.
The purpose of the task was to get a measure of how
successfully consumers chose their wines, asmeasuredLYNCH AND ARIELY
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by their rated liking for wines purchased and not pur-
chased. The local wine expert mentioned earlier chose
the wines to be included in the wine-tasting test. Our
goal was to include the most popular wines in the set.
We hoped that this approach would maximize the
probability that each consumer would have purchased
at least some of the wines included in the wine-tasting,
thereby permitting the above measures to be
calculated.
Before starting the taste test, respondentsweregiven
a choice of whether to taste 10 red or 10 white wines
taken from the earlier wine-shopping task. We as-
sumed that, given individual preferences for red and
white wines, allowing the choice would again increase
the probability that a respondent would taste some of
the wines he or she had purchased. Each wine was
rated on a scale from 0 (poor) to 10 (excellent). Because
each respondent had purchased some of the winesand
had not purchased others, we could computehisorher
mean liking for both wines they had previouslychosen
and ones they had not.
Procedure forWine TastingTask. Withineachset,
the wines were tasted in an order from light to heavy,
as is recommended for wine tasting. Respondents
tasted 0.5 ﬂuid ounces of each wine from a plastic cup.
Baguettes and water were available to cleanse their
palates. Respondents were told by the experimenter
pouring the wines not to discuss their perceptionswith
other participants. The wine tasting was not blind. We
were trying to mimic the real world, where, if infor-
mation from electronic shopping makes people think
that they like a product better, this affects their expe-
rienced utility. The labels of the wines but not their
prices were visible during tasting.
After all 10 wines had been tasted, respondentswere
thanked and dismissed. They were told thattheycould
pick up their ordered merchandise later that week. To
guarantee that all participants beneﬁted from the
promised discounted prices, we chose to fulﬁll orders
from a shopping trip when half the wines were on sale.
Prior to picking up their wines, participants were no-
tiﬁed by e-mail of which wines they had ordered on
the selected trial and of the prices of those wines. Par-
ticipants paid by cash or check.
Dependent Measure: Retention. Two months af-
ter the completion of the study, participants were
asked if they would like to subscribe to the same
electronic-shopping wine service from their homes.
They received the following message: “During Term 1,
you participated in our study on electronichomeshop-
ping for wines. We would like to get your feedback on
your experience and to assess your interest in contin-
uing on in another phase of the study in which you
would be able to order wines during Terms 3 and 4.
Would you be interested in participating in the next
phase of the study? If you say yes, we will e-mail you
our wine program to install on your computer to use
at your convenience. You would pick up your wines
and pay for them at the kiosk on the following day.
You would have exactly the same interface and mer-
chants as you had in the earlier stage.
Yes, please e-mail me the program
No, I am not interested in participating”
Results
Price Sensitivity. We had two measures of price
sensitivity: Quantity Difference and Price Elasticity.
Thus, we have two tests of every key ANOVA effect
in a 2   2   2   2 mixed design with Price Usability
  Quality Usability of Information   Store Compar-
ability as between-subjects factors and Wine Block
Uniqueness as a repeated factor. In the results pre-
sented below, we use MANOVA as protection against
escalating type 1 errors that would be expected if each
measure were analyzed separately.
Eight participants purchased no common wines.
This creates division by zero in Equation (1); conse-
quently, we had “missing” values for common wine
Price Elasticity for those eight participants. MANO-
VAs dropped those eight participants. There were no
missing values for unique wine Price Elasticity or for
unique or common wine Quantity Difference. When
follow-up tests could be conducted either on the 64
participants with complete data or on all 72 partici-
pants, qualitative results were identical in termsofpat-
terns and statistical signiﬁcance. We report follow-up
tests on the full data set whenever possible below.
The theoreticallycriticalMANOVAresultswerethat
there was a signiﬁcant multivariate main effect of
Quality Usability [F(2,55)   6.50, p  0.003] and a sig-
niﬁcant multivariate interaction of Store Comparabil-
ity   Wine Block Uniqueness [F(2,55)   3.87, p LYNCH AND ARIELY
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Figure 5 Price Sensitivity Measures as a Function of Store
Comparability and Wine Block Uniqueness
Note: Figure 5A shows the results for Quantity Difference, and Figure 5B
shows the results for Price Elasticity.
Figure 4 Price Sensitivity Measures as a Function of Quality Usabil-
ity.
Note: Quantity Difference measures (Quantity at Low Price   Quantity at
High Price) are on the left and Self Elasticity measures are on the right. For
both measures, more negative numbers imply greater price sensitivity.
0.03]. We followed up with univariate tests for Quan-
tity Difference and Price Elasticity below.
For both dependent variables, therewasasigniﬁcant
univariate effect of Quality Usability. Quantity Differ-
ence showed a more negative slope in the demand
curve for low Quality Usability (M    0.90) than for
high Quality Usability (M    0.13), [F(1,56)   13.08,
p  0.01]. (Interpret  0.90 to mean that for each block
of 20 wines, the average respondent in Low Quality-
Usability conditions bought 0.90 less bottles in total
during the four trips when those wines were at regular
price than on the four trips when the same wines were
discounted by 15%.) Similarly, respondents showed
greater Price Elasticity for low Quality Usability (M  
 2.47) than for high Quality Usability (M    0.52),
[F(1,56)   3.88, p  0.054]. See Figure 4.
When the parallel analysis is done on all 72 respon-
dents—by pooling across all six wine blocks to avoid
missing values for the eight participants—the effects
described above are strengthened. The greater n and
the balanced cell sizes increase statistical power. The
multivariate main effect of Quality Usability is signiﬁ-
cant, [F(2,63)   6.83, p  0.003], as are the univariate
tests for Quantity Difference [F(1,64)   13.67, p 
0.001] and Price Elasticity [F(1,64)   7.89, p  0.007].
There was a signiﬁcant univariate interaction of
Store Comparability   wine block uniqueness for
Quantity Difference [F(1,64)   4.84, p  0.04] and for
Price Elasticity [F(1,56)   6.89, p  0.02]. The similar
patterns for Quantity Difference and Price Elasticity
can be seen in Figure 5.
Simple-effects follow-up tests for Quantity Differ-
ence showed that for unique wine blocks, increasing
Store Comparability had no effect [F(1,64)   0.00],
with M    0.41 for high Store Comparability and M
   0.42 for low Store Comparability. For common
wines, Quantity Difference was signiﬁcantlyhigherfor
high Store Comparability (M    0.96) than for low
Store Comparability (M    0.17), [F(1,64)   10.45, p
 0.002].
Parallel simple-effects tests for unique wine Price
Elasticity showed that increasing Store Comparability
had no effect [F(1,56)   2.68, p  0.11], with direction-
ally lower Price Elasticity when Store Comparability
was high (M    0.80) as opposed to low (M  
 2.27). For common wines, Price Elasticity was sig-
niﬁcantly higher for high Store Comparability (M  
 2.04) than for low Store Comparability (M   0.91),
[F(1,56)   4.57, p  0.04].
Process Measures and Price Sensitivity. Recall
that experimental conditions varied in the opportunity
or necessity for various processing operations during
search. We correlated measures of Price Elasticity and
Quantity Difference (pooling over all six wine blocks)LYNCH AND ARIELY
Wine Online: Search Costs Affect Competition on Price, Quality, and Distribution
94 Marketing Science/Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2000
with various measures of process. For all the correla-
tions, note that a negative correlationimpliesthatmore
of the processing activity is associated withmorenega-
tively sloped demand curves and more PriceElasticity.
We make no causal interpretations.
Scroll, a measure of breadth of search, was associ-
ated with greater (negative) Quantity Difference (r  
 0.34, p  0.01, df   70) and more (negative) elastic-
ity (r    0.24, p  0.05, df   70). This is expected,
because scrolling increases potential consideration-set
size. Moreover, scrolling is associated with a pattern
of shallow search focusing on price, not quality. Sort
by Price (possible only for respondents in the high
Price Usability conditions) also increased with price
elasticity (r    0.35, p  0.04, df   34) and margin-
ally increased with Quantity Difference (r    0.29, p
 0.09, df   34). Sort by Varietal (possible only for
respondents in the high Quality Usability condition)
had no reliableeffect. DrillforWineComment(drilling
down for a differentiating wine comment in the high
Quality Usability conditions) decreased price elasticity
(r    0.45, p  0.01, df   34) and Quantity Difference
(r    0.48, p  0.01, df   34). As expected, Drill for
Missing—drilling down for information that wasmiss-
ing from the ﬁrst-level screen—was associated with
more Price Elasticity (r    0.63, p  0.01, df   16)
and Quantity Difference (r    0.60, p  0.01, df  
16) when the information that was missing was only
price information (in the high Quality Usability, low
Price Usability condition). However, when drilling
down revealed either quality information alone (high
Price Usability, low Quality Usability) or both quality
and price (low Price Usability, low Quality Usability),
correlations with Price Elasticity and Quantity Differ-
ence did not differ signiﬁcantly from zero or from each
other.
Process Mediation of Effects of Search Costs on
Price Sensitivity. In the foregoing zero-order corre-
lation analyses, we treated a given process measure as
missing whenever it was structurally zero—e.g., be-
cause a price-sorting tool was unavailable to subjects
in low Price Usability conditions. In the analyses re-
ported next, we examine whether variations in pat-
terns of search mediate the two key effects of our de-
sign variables on price sensitivity: the Quality
Usability main effect and the Store Comparability  
Unique/Common Wine interaction. For these analy-
ses, we coded the process variables as zero rather than
missing when they were structurally unavailable.
As a preliminary step, we analyzed the effects of
Price Usability, Quality Usability, and Store Compar-
ability on Scroll, Sort by Price, Sort by Varietal, Drill
for Wine Comment, and Drill for Missing. Table 1
shows cell means.
Recall that the primary between-subjects result was
a main effect of Quality Usability, such that Price Elas-
ticity and Quantity Difference were less negativewhen
Quality Usability was high rather than low. A MAN-
OVA with Price Elasticity and Quantity Difference cal-
culated across all six wine blocks showed that Drill for
Wine Comment had a signiﬁcant multivariate main ef-
fect [F(2,56)   6.04, p  0.005], but that there was no
remaining partial effect of Quality Usability with pro-
cess variables in the model [F(2,56)   0.48].
A separate mediation analysis for the Store Com-
parability   Wine Uniquenessinteractionshowedthat
(Unique–Common) difference scores were not predict-
able by the process measures and the effect of Store
Comparability (i.e., the Store Comparability   Wine
Uniqueness interaction) remained highly signiﬁcant. It
is unsurprising that process measures do not mediate
the Store Comparability   Wine Uniqueness interac-
tion, because the process measures do not distinguish
between search for unique and common wines.
Prices Paid and Quantity Sold. We showed above
that high Store Comparability increased price sensitiv-
ity for common wines, but not for unique wines. To
understand the effect of this heightened price sensitiv-
ity on proﬁt, however, requires an analysis of prices
paid and quantity sold. We cannot meaningfully cal-
culate proﬁtability without making arbitrary assump-
tions about marginal costs.
We can, however, report analyses of average price
paid per bottle of wine in common and unique blocks
analyzed as a function of Price Usability, Quality Us-
ability, and Store Comparability. The eight subjects
who bought no common wines were dropped fromthe
analysis. Interestingly, seven of the eight were in high
Store Comparability conditions.LYNCH AND ARIELY
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Table 1 Effects of Price-Usability, Quality-Usability, and Ease of Store-Comparability on price sensitivity (Price Elasticity and Quantity
Difference), number of Scrolls, Sorts by Price, Sorts by Varietal, Drills for Wine Comment, and Drills for Missing Price and/or Quality
Information
Price
Usability
Quality
Usability
Store
Comparability
Price
Elasticity
Quantity
Difference Scroll Sort Price
Sort
Varietal
Drill
Wine Comment
Drill
Missing N
High High High  0.66 0.11 118.9 3.9 2.9 45.4 0.0 9
High High Low  0.23 0.30 119.8 5.3 5.1 41.7 0.0 9
High Low High  3.99  1.54 147.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 69.4 9
High Low Low  1.68  0.63 203.2 10.1 0.0 0.0 58.4 9
Low High High  0.94  0.39 196.6 0.0 6.2 26.7 89.7 9
Low High Low  0.26 0.04 119.6 0.0 9.9 32.0 69.3 9
Low Low High  2.69  0.56 207.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 83.9 9
Low Low Low  1.52  0.59 262.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.9 9
There were two key results showing that unique
wines sold for higher prices than common ones, but
only when store comparison was high and when price
usability was high. First, a Store Comparability  
Wine Block Uniqueness interaction (F(1,56)   4.24, p
 0.05) showed that unique wines were sold at higher
average prices than common ones in high Store Com-
parability (M   $11.25 versus $9.48, F(1,25)   10.96,
p  0.003), but not in low Store Comparability condi-
tions (M   $10.41 versus $10.17, F(1,31)   0.21, p 
0.64). Second, a Price Usability   Wine Block Unique-
ness interaction (F(1,56)  3.85, p 0.055) showedthat
unique wines sold at higher average prices than com-
mon wines when Price Usability was high (M   $11.08
versus $9.52, F (1,29)   11.23, p  0.002), but not when
Price Usability was low ($10.48 versus $10.22, F(1,27)
  0.26, p  0.61). Both of these interactions were mod-
erated by a marginally signiﬁcant three-way interac-
tion of Store Comparability   Price Usability   Com-
mon versus Unique wine blocks (F(1,56)   2.95, p 
0.10). The locus of the effect was that unique wine
blocks commanded higher prices than common ones
only under conditions of high Store Comparabilityand
high Price Usability (M   $11.79 versus $8.74, F(1,13)
  21.21, p  0.001). In all other combinations of Store
Comparability and Price Usability, the simple compar-
isons of unique versus common wines were nonsig-
niﬁcant, with all F values  1. Thus, a pricing advan-
tage for unique wines emerges only in relatively
transparent environments.
Next, we analyzed average quantity per block of
Common and Unique wines as a function of Price Us-
ability, Quality Usability, and Store Comparability.
The results did not support the hypothesis that high
Store Comparability increases sales, and the trend was
in the opposite direction [F(1,64)   3.18, p   0.08].
This, however, was moderated by a three-way inter-
action of Quality Usability   Store Comparability  
Uniqueness [F(1,64)   5.65, p  0.021]. Follow-uptests
showed that the simple interaction of Store Compara-
bility   Uniqueness was present when Quality Usa-
bility was high (F(1,32)   3.90, p  0.058). When Qual-
ity Usability was high and Store Comparability was
low, common wines (M   6.9) outsold unique wines
(M   5.0). When Store Comparability was high,
though, the reverse was true; unique wines (M   3.5)
outsold common ones (M   2.6). Neither simple effect
was signiﬁcant, F(1,16)   1.37 and 2.54, respectively.
When Quality Usability was low, the relative advan-
tage of unique wines did not depend on Store Com-
parability (F(1,32)   1.79, p  0.19), nor was there any
signiﬁcant simple main effect of Uniqueness, (F(1,32)
  2.07, p  0.15).
An unexpected Price Usability   Quality Usability
interaction arose (F(1,64)   4.57, p  0.05) because
shoppers bought less wine when Price Usability and
Quality Usability wereboth low(M 3.7)orbothhigh
(M   3.5) than in conditions of Low Quality Usability-
High Price Usability (M   6.7) or High Quality
Usability-Low Quality Usability (M   5.5). PerhapsLYNCH AND ARIELY
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equal usability of price and quality information pro-
duces more conﬂict, which leads to deferral of choice
(Dhar 1997, Luce 1998).
Measures of Consumer Welfare. Next we report
measures of consumer welfare that conﬁrm the obvi-
ous point that our shoppers prefer more transparent
informational environments. We expected and found
that consumers’ liking for the shopping experience in-
creased as we lowered all three kinds of search costs,
and that they would be more likely to be retained
when asked two months later to continue using the
same wine-shopping interface to buy wines from
home. We expected and found that environments that
made wine quality more transparent (by making qual-
ity more usable and by allowing store comparison of
wines) allowed consumers to choose wines better
suited to their personal tastes.
For each of these dependent measures, we report
two kinds of analyses. First, we report a 2   2   2
Price Usability   Quality Usability   Store Compar-
ability ANOVA in which we anticipate that a main ef-
fects model should explain all reliable variance among
the eight cell means. Second, we report the test of a
more parsimonious model nested in the former that
constrained the coefﬁcients on relevant main effects to
be the same. We regressed each welfare measure on
the sum of the dummy variables for the individual
main effects—a “transparency” index.
Because we have predictions about the sign and not
the magnitude of the different search cost effects on
consumer welfare, we know from the literature on unit
weighting schemes in decision making (Einhorn and
Hogarth 1975) that the constrained models shouldcap-
ture all of the reliable variance in the former. However,
the unit weighting model should have more statistical
power because we estimate a single parameter rather
than separate parameters for each main effect. Four of
nine of the individual main effect coefﬁcients are sig-
niﬁcant in ANOVA analyses below, but the transpar-
ency index is highly signiﬁcant for all three dependent
variables, explaining all reliable between-cell variance
with no signiﬁcant residual. The absence of deviations
from the equal weight models should not be taken as
evidence that the different search costs have exactly
equal effects. Because of the “ﬂat maximum”principle,
modest deviations from the “true” weights that do not
change the sign of the relationship have almost no ef-
fect on overall ﬁt (Dawes and Corrigan 1974). These
analyses should be interpreted as analogous to a
within-study meta-analysis in which we pool the ef-
fects for the different search costs and ask the standard
meta-analytic questions of whether the effect is signiﬁ-
cant in aggregate and if there is signiﬁcant heteroge-
neity in the effects of the three different search costs.
Shopping evaluation. At the end of the shopping
phase of the study, participants were asked to indicate
how enjoyable the shopping experience had been for
them on a 100-point scale. A 2   2   2 ANOVA
showed only three signiﬁcant main effects. Each of the
three components of increased transparency increased
participants’ enjoyment. Shoppingwasmoreenjoyable
when Price Usability was high (M   68.3) rather than
low (M   53.4), [F(1,64)   10.14, p   0.002]; when
Quality Usability was high (M   66.9) rather than low
(M   54.8), [F(1,64)   6.78, p   0.011]; and whenStore
Comparability was high (M   66.9) rather than low
(M   54.7), [F(1,64)   4.69, p   0.034.] No interactions
were signiﬁcant.
We created a summary independent variable, Inter-
face Transparency, by summing the 1-0 dummy vari-
ables for Price Usability, Quality Usability, and Store
Comparability. Regressing enjoyment on transparency
is tantamount to a main-effects-only modelwithequal-
ity constraints on the weights of the 1-0 dummy vari-
ables for the three main effects. Transparency was
highly signiﬁcant [t(71)   4.73, p  0.0001]. Each in-
cremental component of transparency added an aver-
age of 12.4 units of liking on a 100-point scale, as can
be seen in Figure 6. Nested model comparisons
showed that the model including only Transparency
ﬁt as well (R
2   0.242) as one estimating separatemain
effects for the three components of Transparency
[F(2,68)   0.27] or a model estimating all main and
interaction effects of the components [F(6,64)   0.33].
R
2 values were 0.248 and 0.265 respectively, for the
latter two models.
Liking for purchased brands. Consumers tested 10 red
or 10 white wines after shopping. For the set of 10, we
computed the mean rated liking of the subset that the
consumer had purchased earlier on at least one of the
eight shopping trials, dropping from the analysis threeLYNCH AND ARIELY
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Figure 6 Shopping Enjoyment as a Function of “Interface Transpar-
ency” of Shopping Environment
Note: Interface Transparency is sum of dummy variables for Price Usability,
Quality Usability, and Store Comparability.
Figure 7 Taste Test Liking for Wine as a Function of Quality Trans-
parency (Quality Usability StoreComparabilityDummies)
and Price Usability
participants who did not purchase any of the 10 wines
that they later tasted. We regressed this measure of
liking for the purchased brands on the main effects of
Price Usability, Quality Usability, and Store Compar-
ability, and the mean liking of wines not purchased.
The latter is a covariate that controls for individual dif-
ferences in scale usage, liking for wine in general, etc.
We expected that consumers would make better
choices—liking the purchased wines more—when
Quality Transparency was high—that is, when Quality
Usability and ease of Store Comparability were high.
ANOVA results showed a signiﬁcant effect of the
covariate rating of unpurchasedwines[F(1,64) 47.7],
a main effect for Quality Usability [F(1,64)   6.74, p
  0.012], and a marginal main effect for Store Com-
parability [F(1,64)   2.98, p   0.089]. As expected,
consumers were better able to choose wines they liked
when Quality Usability was high (M   5.97) rather
than low (M   5.21) and when Store Comparability
was high (M   5.85) rather than low (M   5.33). Both
of these effects supported the hypothesis that infor-
mation systems that are more complete and informa-
tive will elicit higher ratings. These results support the
idea that increasing quality information makes con-
sumers better able to choose merchandise that matches
their personal tastes. There was no effect for Price Us-
ability [F(1,64)   0.00].
We replaced the main effects of Quality Usability
and Store Comparability dummies in the model with
a Quality Transparency index equal to the sum of their
dummies—constraining their weights to be equal in
magnitude and direction. Model R
2   0.502 for the
constrained model, which does not differ signiﬁcantly
from the R
2   0.513 of the full ANOVA model [F(5,60)
  0.27] or the R
2   0.505 of main effectsmodel[F(1,64)
  0.35). This analysis leads to the conclusion that lik-
ing for the chosen wines increases by 0.64 of a scale
point on a 10-point scale for each improvement in
Quality Transparency [t(65)   3.05, p  0.003], with
Price Usability still showing zero effect [t(65)   0.02].
Figure 7 plots the results.
3
3A reviewer argued that the Quality Transparency index should in-
clude Price Usability in addition to Quality UsabilityandStoreCom-
parison. We cannot reject this view. When we replace our Quality
Transparency index with the InterfaceTransparencyindexthatsums
the dummies for all three search costs, the model R
2   .479 does not
differ signiﬁcantly from an unconstrained model that estimates each
main effect separately [F(2,64)   1.66, p   0.20], and differs onlyLYNCH AND ARIELY
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Figure 8 Retention as a Function of Interface Transparency (Sum of
Dummies for Price Usability, Quality Usability, and Store
Comparability)
Two other ﬁndings for this dependent variable bear
mention. First, we analyzed the number of bottlesfrom
our taste-test sample that participants purchased. Our
wine expert had identiﬁed these as the wines in our
inventory most often purchased by inexperienced con-
sumers. We found a main effect for Store Comparabil-
ity [F(1,61)   6.54, p   0.013]. Participants in the low
Store Comparability condition purchased more of our
sample than participants in the high Store Compara-
bility condition. We speculate that in the high Store
Comparability condition consumers were better able
to choose wines that deviated from the group norms.
Second, we correlated our search variables with the
difference in rated liking of chosen and unchosen
wines, using only cells for which a search variable was
not structurally zero. In the high Price Usability con-
ditions, sorting by price was associated with lower lik-
ing for chosen wines relative to unchosen ones (r  
 0.34, p  0.05).
Retention. Two months after the ﬁrst phase of the
study, participants were invited to take part in a sec-
ond phase in which they would be e-mailed software
from the experiment that would allow them to shop
from home. Their agreement was our measure of re-
tention. Three participants did not respond. We ana-
lyzed the data treating those nonresponses both as
missing and as a failure to retain. We present the for-
mer results, which prove to yield slightly more con-
servative conclusions.
Yes/No responses were analyzed by a 2   2   2
Price Usability   Quality Usability   Store Compar-
ability ANOVA. The results showed a marginally sig-
niﬁcant main effect for Quality Usability [F(1,61)  
2.91, p   0.093] and a marginally signiﬁcant main ef-
fect for Store Comparability [F(1,61)   3.77, p  
0.057]. Logit and probit regressions including the main
effects of Price Usability, Quality Usability, and Store
Comparability all led to the same conclusions, albeit
with slightly more power. When Quality Usabilitywas
marginally from a model that relaxes the constraint that Price Usa-
bility must share a common coefﬁcient with Quality Usability and
Store Comparability, [F(1,65)   3.0, p  0.09]. The coefﬁcient on the
transparency index implies that each search cost reduced improves
liking for the chosen wines by 0.42 scale points [t(66)   2.48, p 
0.02].
low, 29% requested software to use the service further,
compared with 49% when Quality Usability was high.
When Store Comparability was low, 27% were re-
tained, whereas 50% were retained when Store Com-
parability was high. The Store Comparability effect be-
comes signiﬁcant at conventional levels if missing
responses are treated as “No” responses.
Our expectation was that between-cell differencesin
retention probability would be completely accounted
f o rb ya1d fcontrast for Interface Transparency, de-
ﬁned as the sum of the 1-0 dummy variables for Price
Usability, Quality Usability, and Store Comparability.
This expectation was supported. Retention signiﬁ-
cantly increased with Transparency [F(1,61)   7.11, p
 0.01], and there was no signiﬁcant residualbetween-
cell variation after subtracting out variance due to
Transparency [F(6,61)   0.24]. If Retentionisregressed
on Transparency alone, Retentionprobabilityincreases
17.4% for every added element of Transparency, as
seen in Figure 8.
Market Share of Common Wines. We suggested
in the introduction that retailers may respond to con-
sumer demand for more transparency by coupling in-
creased transparency with a merchandising shift. In-
creasingly, retailers might seek exclusive distributionLYNCH AND ARIELY
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from manufacturers and rely less on common mer-
chandise. We showed above that high Store Compar-
ability increased price sensitivity for common wines.
We now address the question of how market share re-
turns to distribution are affected by lowered search
costs.
We examined the effects of Price Usability, Quality
Usability, and Store Comparability on the per-
customer market share of the common wines in our
experiment. For each customer, we calculated the
share of common wines, (quantity of common wines)/
(quantity of unique wines   quantity of common
wines). Results showed a main effect for ease of Store
Comparability, [F(1,64)   4.99, p  0.05]. The common
wines had an average 35.9% market share when Store
Comparability was low, and an average 26.2% market
share when it was high. The implication is that man-
ufacturer returns to distribution are diminished in
electronic environments that make cross-shopping
easy rather than hard.
It is instructive to compare each of these market
shares to two benchmark null hypotheses. Consider
the null hypothesis that the common wines’ market
share is proportional to their share of distribution—
i.e., one-third of the merchandise at each of the two
competing stores. Given the 35.9% share in the low
Store Comparability condition, one cannot reject that
null hypothesis [t(35)   0.83, p  0.4], but the 26.2%
common wine share in the high Store Comparability
condition is signiﬁcantly lower than 33.3% [t(35)  
 2.36, p  0.05].
We noted that even when Store Comparability was
high, wines sold in both stores attained disproportion-
ately high market share. We formed Common and
Unique wine blocksby dividingour 100winesintoﬁve
stratiﬁed random samples of 20 wines each, then ran-
domly designating one of the ﬁve blocks as the one to
be sold in both stores. If thecustomerrealizedtheiden-
tity of the wines sold in both stores, then the market
share of those wines would be one-ﬁfth, not one-third,
as in similarity effects (Tversky 1972). Common wines
had signiﬁcantly more than 20% market share for both
high Store Comparability [t(35)   2.08, p  0.05] and
low Store Comparability [t(35)   5.33, p  .0001].
Thus, there appear to be positive returns to distribu-
tion for electronic merchants even when cross-
shopping is easy.
One possible reason for this higher-than-20% share
is that common wines are available at low prices in at
least one store on six out of eight trials in the experi-
ment. The unique wines are discounted on only four
of the eight trials. To control for differences in pricing,
we analyzed share of the common wines in the one
trial out of eight in which all wines sold at their high
price. We report here an aggregate analysis because
too many subjectsbought nowinesonthattrialtomea-
sure share at the individual level. In aggregate, the
common wines had a 23.4% share in the high Store
Comparability condition (22 of 94 bottles purchased)
and a 35.2% share in the low Store Comparability con-
dition (44 of 125 bottles purchased). These percentages
differed marginally from each other [v
2 (1)   3.55, p
 0.06]. The 23.4% share differs signiﬁcantly from the
null hypothesis of 33.3%—i.e., share proportional to
distribution—[v
2 (1)   4.17, p  0.05]. It doesnotdiffer
signiﬁcantly from the null hypothesis of 20%—share
equal to fraction of all available wines in the common
block, [v
2 (1)   0.68, p  0.4]. The 35.2% share does
not differ signiﬁcantly from the null hypothesis of
33.3%, [v
2 (1)   0.20, p  0.65], but it does differ from
the null hypothesis of 20%, [v
2 (1)   18.1, p  0.0001].
Discussion
Implications for Retailers
Both academics and popular business-press writers
have stressed the potential for electronic retailing to
increase competition, owing largely to easier price
search. Alba et al. (1997) argued that established re-
tailers’ fears of increased price competition have led
them to underinvest and to attempt to create electronic
venues that minimize exposure to competition. The re-
sult, ironically, was that their defensive offerings gave
customers little reason to shop electronically, leading
to poor sales that they then misinterpreted as an in-
dication that the electronic venue had low potential.
We have argued that the conventional analysisover-
looks two important countervailing principles that
have received ample documentation in marketing re-
search on the economics of information. First, elec-
tronic shopping can also reduce search costs for dif-
ferentiating quality information (Alba et al. 1997,LYNCH AND ARIELY
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Bakos 1997). It has been well established that differ-
entiating information can lower price sensitivity (Kaul
and Wittink 1995, cf. Mitra and Lynch 1995). Making
it easy for consumers to compare across stores need
not intensify price competition—at least not if com-
peting stores are selling exclusive (nonoverlapping)
merchandise. Consequently, if a retailer cooperates in
efforts to lower search costs for price, for quality in-
formation, and for comparison across stores, it may
well be that consumer price sensitivity will be no
greater than it is currently at electronic retailing sites.
It is a matter of the relative strength of the threeeffects.
Our empirical results support this conjecture, but
not without boundary conditions noted below. We ex-
amined the effects of Price Usability, Quality Usability,
and ease of Store Comparability on price sensitivity.
We found that increasing Price Usability had no reli-
able effect, but increasing Quality Usability decreased
price sensitivity. Increasing ease of Store Comparabil-
ity did not increase quantity sold; it increased price
sensitivity for Common wines sold by both competing
merchants, but not for wines unique to one merchant.
In the marketplace, similar effects would create incen-
tives for retailers to carry more unique merchandise.
Only low-cost retailers who can expect to undercut ri-
vals on price will beneﬁt from higher Store Compara-
bility for common merchandise.
The second part of our thesis is that offering con-
sumers the beneﬁts of transparency improves con-
sumer welfare. We showed that consumers werebetter
able to choose wines that they liked in taste tests when
they used electronic interfaces that maximized the
transparency of quality information. Erlich and Fisher
(1982) argue that if information has the potential to
reduce the full price of a good (purchase price   cost
of search   costs from disappointing purchases), con-
sumers will demand it. We therefore predicted that by
maximizing the transparency of the information envi-
ronment for consumers, retailers would earn their re-
peat business—or, alternatively, that consumers
would not be trapped in impoverished, defensive sites
of low transparency. Our ﬁndings show exactly that.
Retention was signiﬁcantly higher for shoppers in
more transparent informational environments when
we recontacted them two months after the experiment
with the offer to continue the same service.
Collectively, our ﬁndings imply that retailers should
be open to cooperation with third-party agents allow-
ing cross-store comparison, but should avoid com-
moditization by increasing the uniqueness of their
merchandise. When they cooperate with comparison-
shopping engines, it is in their interest to make the
informational base include richer differentiating infor-
mation. Current comparison agents have relativelyim-
poverished criteria, effectively increasing Price Usabil-
ity and Store Comparability without increasing
Quality Usability (The Economist 1997, Quick 1998a).
See, e.g., http://www.zdnet.com/computershopper/,
and contrast this with www.bizrate.com, which at-
tempts to provide better and more easily processed in-
formation on retailer quality, thus making it more vi-
able to compete on quality.
Implications for Manufacturers: Effects of
Distribution on Market Share
Most of our analysis takes a retailer’s perspective on
the problem of whether or not to participate in trans-
parent electronicmarketsthat permiteasycomparison.
Retailers’ incentives affect the derived demand for
manufacturers’ brands. Perhaps our most striking
ﬁndings are those showing how transparent compari-
son affects the relative attractiveness to retailers of ex-
clusive brands versus those carried by their competi-
tors. Demand for common brands becomes more price
sensitive, and the market share of common brands is
reduced.
Considering this ﬁnding from the manufacturer’s
perspective, we see that transparent comparison re-
duces returns to distribution. We showed that when
Store Comparability is low, the market share of com-
mon brands was proportional to market share, but
when Store Comparability was high, the market share
of wines carried in two stores was no higher than the
share of unique wines carried by only one store. Our
results are consistent with Alba et al.’s (1997) conjec-
ture that easy comparison may militatetowardaworld
in which manufacturers will be more open to selling
retailers private label merchandise, branded variants,
and partnering with a single powerful retailer to offer
outright exclusives. This issue of the inﬂuence of
search costs on branding and branded merchandise
deserves signiﬁcant future research.LYNCH AND ARIELY
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Conclusions and Future Research
The challenge to online merchants is not to fortify their
defensive positions. In a competitive environment, the
strategy of keeping some search costs high is arguably
doomed to fail. Rather, retailers’ task is to learn how
to provide consumers with useful product-related in-
formation that will increase consumer retention by in-
creasing consumers’ satisfaction with the merchandise
they purchase. Although we studied only the behavior
of consumers, our research also highlights the inter-
connectedness of retailers’ merchandising decisions
with their decisions about cooperating to lower search
costs. Lowered search costs may reduce the proﬁtabil-
ity to retailers of internationally branded merchandise
carried by competing retailers. Taken together, retail-
ers are given incentives to invest in specialization—
providing deep information about a (perhaps smaller)
inventory of exclusive merchandise. The kinds of price
pressures on electronic retailers that have been amply
discussed in the business press may translate to un-
foreseen second-order pressures on manufacturers of
branded merchandise.
The net effects of retailer decisions about search
costs and merchandising on price sensitivity, con-
sumer welfare, and retailer incentive to carry exclusive
merchandise are a matter of calibration of the strength
of effects of our three search costs. We chose the prod-
uct category of wines quite deliberately in an attempt
to demonstrate our rhetorical points. Thus, what we
expect to generalize is our conceptual point about the
tradeoff of these search costs rather than our speciﬁc
ﬁnding that the differentiating effects of quality usa-
bility dominate the effects of lowering search costs for
price information. Our conceptual framework can be
adapted to any speciﬁc electronic shopping
environment.
Beyond these matters of calibration, there are inter-
esting questions of the external validity of our ﬁndings
that turn on the interaction of our conceptual search-
cost variables with background factors held constant
in our experiment (Lynch 1982). Below we consider
potential moderators of the effects in our experiment
that deserve attention in future research.
First, Bakos (1997) argues that lowering search costs
for price should matter less when lack-of-ﬁt costs are
higher. Such a pattern should occur in product classes
characterized by a high degree of real differentiation,
such as wines. In such a market there is great potential
for well-done electronic shopping to increase consum-
ers’ ability to choose goods that they like better than
those they would have chosen in another shopping
medium. In commodity-type markets, perhaps the ef-
fect of making prices more transparent would prevail.
Our ﬁndings for common wines are consistent with
this conjecture. Arguably, when alternatives are the
same, easy comparison is lowering search cost for
price. Further empirical and analytical work on seller
incentives to disclose parity versus differentiation is
needed (cf. Bakos 1997, Shaffer and Zettelmeyer 1998).
Second, Bakos deduces that the search cost for price
should matter more when there are more sellers. We
had 100 distinct wines, but only two retailers. Perhaps
if we had replicated our results with, say, six retailers
instead of two, we would have found that the neteffect
of lowering all three component search costs would
have been to increase price sensitivity.
Third, consider the mix of common and unique
wines at the two stores. In categories like books, CDs,
and travel, the major electronic retailers may have ex-
tremely high overlap of merchandise (e.g., Clemons et
al. 1999). In categories like clothing and housewares,
the overlap is much lower. In our research, each store
stocked two thirds unique and one third common
wines. What would happen if the overlap of merchan-
dise were higher—e.g., 90% common and 10% unique?
One simple answer is that a higher fraction of the mer-
chandise would behave as the common block, leading
to high price sensitivity whenstorecomparisoniseasy.
Increasing the shareofthecommonmerchandisecould
also increase consumers’ incentive to search to see if
another retailer is carrying the same item for a lower
price.
Fourth, prices in our study were exogenous. It is an
open question how our results would change if pricing
were endogenous. Electronic retailing makes it easier
to monitor competitors and to respond in a rivalrous
manner (Cortese 1998). Gatignon’s (1984) research on
advertising suggests that such circumstances mighttip
the balance of the effects of transparency toward
greater price sensitivity.
Fifth, Mitra and Lynch (1995) argue that the pathLYNCH AND ARIELY
Wine Online: Search Costs Affect Competition on Price, Quality, and Distribution
102 Marketing Science/Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2000
from advertising to differentiated preferences is stron-
gest when consumers begin with little knowledge. The
same point should hold for differentiation via elec-
tronic shopping. If consumers learn about alternatives
off-line and only come online to complete the trans-
action, there would be little differentiation effect to off-
set the lowered costs of search for price and for com-
paring sellers of the preselected good.
This same conceptual point suggests interesting av-
enues for future research on dynamic changes in price
sensitivity over time after a cohort of consumers has
adopted a full-featured electronic shopping system.
Consider highly differentiated markets in which there
is little new entry over time, but where prices remain
volatile over time due to promotion, etc. A full-
featured electronic shopping systemmightcauseshop-
pers to be less price-sensitive when theyﬁrstshopelec-
tronically than when they shop in brick-and-mortar
stores. But after some time, consumers will have
learned about whatever product differences exist.
Once real product differencesarelearned,thepotential
of electronic shopping to achieve further differentia-
tion would diminish while consumers’ ability to track
and compare volatile prices would remain. Thus, one
might expect that with theintroductionoffull-featured
electronic shopping, price sensitivity would ﬁrst de-
crease and then increase over time compared with
price sensitivity in brick-and-mortar retail environ-
ments. In a category such as wine, there is constant
turnover in the set of competing alternatives. Here
electronic shopping systems may continue to be valu-
able media for differentiation.
All is not lost even when consumers can learn. As in
a brick-and-mortar world, electronic sellers can learn
about customers’ tastes. They then can use this infor-
mation to provide better and better tailored advice
about which alternatives would maximize customer
utility. Retailers can offer customers ancillary services
such as Peapod’s “Personal Lists” that reduce price
sensitivity (Degeratu et al. 1998). They can use cus-
tomer data to anticipate utility better, using smart
agents to build trust (Urban 1998). Research is needed
to learn how retailers can use electronic commerce not
to compete on price, but to capture the value of differ-
entiation for their customers and themselves.
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